CHOP: Bypassing Runtime Bounds Checking Through Convex Hull OPtimization by Chen, Yurong et al.
1CHOP: Bypassing Runtime Bounds Checking
Through Convex Hull OPtimization
Yurong Chen, Hongfa Xue, Tian Lan, Guru Venkataramani
Abstract—Unsafe memory accesses in programs written using
popular programming languages like C/C++ have been among
the leading causes for software vulnerability. Prior memory
safety checkers such as SoftBound enforce memory spatial
safety by checking if every access to array elements are within
the corresponding array bounds. However, it often results in
high execution time overhead due to the cost of executing the
instructions associated with bounds checking. To mitigate this
problem, redundant bounds check elimination techniques are
needed. In this paper, we propose CHOP, a Convex Hull OP-
timization based framework, for bypassing redundant memory
bounds checking via profile-guided inferences. In contrast to
existing check elimination techniques that are limited by static
code analysis, our solution leverages a model-based inference to
identify redundant bounds checking based on runtime data from
past program executions. For a given function, it rapidly derives
and updates a knowledge base containing sufficient conditions
for identifying redundant array bounds checking. We evaluate
CHOP on real-world applications and benchmark (such as SPEC)
and the experimental results show that on average 80.12% of
dynamic bounds check instructions can be avoided, resulting in
improved performance up to 95.80% over SoftBound.
Index Terms—Memory Safety, Convex hull, Bounds Check
I. INTRODUCTION
Many software bugs and vulnerabilities in C/C++ applica-
tions occur due to the unsafe pointer usage and out-of-bound
array accesses. This also gives rise to security exploits taking
advantage of buffer overflows or illegal memory reads and
writes. Below are some of the recent examples. i) A stack
overflow bug inside function getaddrinfo() from glibc was
discovered by a Google engineer in February 2016. Software
using this function could be exploited with attacker-controller
domain names, attacker-controlled DNS servers or through
man-in-the-middle attacks [1]. ii) Cisco released severe se-
curity patches in 2016 to fix a buffer overflow vulnerability in
the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) from Cisco ASA Software.
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to cause a reload of
the affected system or to remotely execute code [2].
In order to protect software from spatial memory/array
bounds violations, tools such as SoftBound [3] have been
developed that maintains metadata (such as array boundaries)
along with rules for metadata propagation when loading/s-
toring pointer values. By doing so, SoftBound ensures that
pointer accesses do not violate boundaries by performing
runtime checks. While such a tool offers protection from
spatial safety violations in programs, we should also note that
they often incur high performance overheads due to a number
of reasons. a) Array bounds checking add extra instructions in
the form of memory loads/stores for pointer metadata, which
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Fig. 1: Runtime overhead for SoftBound compared to original
application
also needs to be duplicated and passed between pointers during
assignments. b) In pointer-intensive programs, such additional
memory accesses can introduce memory bandwidth bottleneck
and further degrade system performance.
To mitigate runtime overheads, static techniques to remove
redundant checks have been proposed. ABCD [4] builds and
solves systems of linear inequalities involving array bounds
and index variables, while WPBound [5] statically computes
the potential ranges of target pointer values inside loops,
then compares them with the array bounds obtained from
SoftBound to avoid SoftBound-related checks.
However, such static approaches are limited by a tradeoff
between the tractability of static analysis and the effective-
ness of redundant checks identification, because optimally
removing redundant checks may require building and solving
constraint systems that become prohibitive. For programs at-
scale, static analysis is often restricted to considering sim-
plified constraint systems (e.g., only difference constraints
in [4]) and thus falls short on achieving high redundant-check
removal/bypassing rate.
In this paper, we propose CHOP, a novel approach that
builds and verifies conditions for eliminating bounds checking
on the fly by harnessing runtime information instead of having
to rely on discovering redundant checks solely during compile-
time or using static code analysis. CHOP is effective in
bypassing a vast majority of redundant array checks while
being simple and elegant. The key idea is to infer the safety
of a pointer dereference based on statistics from past program
executions. If prior executions show that the access of array
A with length L at index i is within bound (which is referred
to as a data point), then it is safe to remove the checks on
any future access of A with length no smaller than L and an
index no larger than i. As a result, a “safe region” is built
by combining the ranges derived from relevant variables and
array lengths in past executions. Any future dereference of
the target pointer will be regarded as safe if it falls within
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2Fig. 2: Non-instrumented Code
1 static void
2 foo(char* src, char* dst,
3 int ssize, int dsize, int snum)
4 {
5 char* cp1;
6 char* cp2;
7 if(ssize+3*snum+1>dsize){
8 dsize = ssize+3*snum;
9 dst = (char*) realloc(dst,dsize);
10 }
11 for ( cp1 = src, cp2 = dst;
12 *cp1 != ’\0’ &&
13 cp2 - dst < dsize - 1;
14 ++cp1, ++cp2 )
15 {
16
17 switch ( *cp1 )
18 {
19 case ’<’:
20 *cp2++ = ’&’;
21 *cp2++ = ’l’;
22 *cp2++ = ’t’;
23 *cp2 = ’;’;
24 break;
25 case ’>’:
26 *cp2++ = ’&’;
27 *cp2++ = ’g’;
28 *cp2++ = ’t’;
29 *cp2 = ’;’;
30 break;
31 default:
32 *cp2 = *cp1;
33 break;
34 }
35 }
36
37 *cp2 = ’\0’;
38 }
Fig. 3: SoftBound Instrumented Code
static void
foo_SB(char* src, char* dst,
int ssize, int dsize, int snum)
{
char* cp1; char* cp2;
if(ssize+3*snum+1>dsize){
dsize = ssize+3*snum;
dst = (char*) realloc(dst,dsize);
}
for ( cp1 = src, cp2 = dst;
*cp1 != ’\0’ && cp2 - dst < dsize - 1;
++cp1, ++cp2 )
{
switch ( *cp1 )
{
case ’<’:
//CHOP: trip count tc1 here
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’&’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’l’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’t’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2 = ’;’;
break;
case ’>’:
//CHOP: trip count tc2 here
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’&’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’g’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2++ = ’t’;
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2 = ’;’;
break;
default:
//CHOP: trip count tc3 here
CHECK_SB(cp1);CHECK_SB(cp2);
*cp2 = *cp1;
break;
}
}
CHECK_SB(cp2);*cp2 = ’\0’;
}
Fig. 4: CHOP Optimized Code
//original foo() function
static void
foo
(char* src, char* dst,
int ssize, int dsize, int snum)
{...}
//SoftBound instrumented foo()
static void
foo_SB
(char* src, char* dst,
int ssize, int dsize, int snum)
{...}
int
main()
{
char *src, *dst;
int ssize, dsize, snum;
...
/*determine whether it’s
inside the safe region*/
if(CHECK_CHOP(src,dst,ssize,dsize,snum))
{
foo(src,dst,ssize,dsize,snum);
}
else
{
foo_SB (src,dst,ssize,dsize,snum)
}
...
}
the safe region. In general, a safe region is the area that
is inferred and built from given data points, such that for
any input points within the region, the corresponding target
pointer is guaranteed to have only safe memory access, e.g.,
all bounds checking related to the pointer can be removed. We
investigated two methods to effectively construct safe regions,
i.e., the union and convex hull approaches. The union approach
builds a safe region by directly merging the safe regions
that are defined by each individual data point. While the
union approach is light-weight and sufficient for data points
with low dimensions, it does not have the ability to infer
a larger safe region from known data points (e.g., through
an affine extension), which is crucial for high-dimensional
data points. In such cases, we can further expand the union
of safe regions to include the entire convex hull, which is
the smallest convex set containing all known data pointers
and their safe regions. Due to such inference, our convex
hull approach is able to render a higher ratio of redundant
check bypassing. As demonstrated through function defang()
from thttpd application, the convex hull approach is shown
to achieve 82.12% redundant check bypassing compared with
59.53% in union approach. To further improve efficiency, we
prioritize CHOP to bounds-check performance hotspots that
incur highest overhead with SoftBound.
In this article, we make the following significant contribu-
tions compared to our previous work SIMBER [6]:
1) We propose CHOP, a tool that let programs bypasses
bounds checking by utilizing convex hull optimization and
runtime profile-guided inferences. We utilize a convex hull-
based approach to build the safe regions for pointer accesses.
With convex hull optimization, CHOP can efficiently handle
high-dimensional data points and the runtime bounds check
bypassing ratio is improved against SIMBER.
2) We observed no false positives of bounds check bypass-
ing from our experimental results. CHOP identifies a bounds
check as redundant only if it is deemed unnecessary using the
sufficient conditions derived from past program executions.
(A “false positive” means a bounds check that should be
conducted is wrongly bypassed.)
3) We evaluate CHOP on expanded set of real-world bench-
marks and validate significant overhead reduction of spatial
safety checks by 66.31% compared to SoftBound on average.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
SoftBound stores the pointer metadata (array base and
bound) when pointers are initialized, and performs array
bounds checking (or validation) when pointers are derefer-
enced. For example, for an integer pointer ptr to an integer
array intArray[100], SoftBound stores ptr base = &intAr-
ray[0] and ptr bound = ptr base + size(intArray). When deref-
erencing ptr+offset, SoftBound obtains the base and bound
information associated with pointer ptr, and performs the
following check: if the value of ptr is less than ptr base, or,
if ptr+offset is larger than ptr bound, the program terminates.
A disadvantage for such an approach is that, it can add
performance overheads to application runtime especially due
to unnecessary metadata tracking and pointer checking for be-
nign pointers. Fig. 1 shows the runtime overhead of SoftBound
instrumented applications over original applications, taking
3thttpd and SPEC2006 [7] as benchmarks. Existing works [4],
[5] mainly analyze relationship between variables in source
code, build constraint systems based on static analysis and
solve the constraints to determine redundant checks.
In CHOP, we propose a novel framework where the
bounds check decisions are made using runtime data and
inferences. Our results show that even limited runtime data
can be quite powerful in inferring the safety of pointer
dereferences. Consider the example shown in Fig. 2, where
foo(src, dst, ssize, dsize, snum) converts the special char-
acters ‘<’ and ‘>’ in string src of length ssize into an
HTML expression while keeping other characters unchanged.
The result is stored in dst of length dsize. The total number
of special characters is snum. Pointer cp2 is dereferenced
repeatedly inside the for loop, e.g., in lines 20-23 and 26-29.
If SoftBound is employed to ensure memory safety, bounds
checking (denoted by CHECK SB in Fig. 3) will be added
before each pointer dereference. For every iteration of the
for loop, the CHECK SB will be executed, thus leading to
intensive checks and overhead. We note that a buffer overflow
will occur only if cp2 is smaller than dst + dsize − 1 at the
end of the second last iteration of the for loop, but exceeds
dst + dsize − 1 during the last iteration. Later, when cp2 is
dereferenced, the access of string dst is past by the bound
given by dsize. It is easy to see the number of iterations
visiting line 19, 25 and 31 determines exactly the length of
string dst. Therefore, dst will have final length 4∗(tc1+tc2)+
tc3+1, where tc1, tc2 and tc3 are three auxiliary branch-count
variables instrumented by CHOP. Any bounds check can be
safely removed as long as 4 ∗ (tc1 + tc2) + tc3 + 1 ≤ dsize.
Existing static approaches such as ABCD [4] that rely on
building and solving simplified constraint systems (e.g., by
considering only pair-wise inequalities) cannot discover such
composite condition involving multiple variables. As a result,
the SoftBound checks will remain in the foo SB() and bound
information of both pointers needs to be kept and propagated
into foo SB() at runtime, leading to high overhead.
In this paper, we show that rapidly removing all the bounds
checking in foo() is indeed possible using CHOP’s statistical
inference. Our solution stems from two key observations.
First, redundant bounds checking can be effectively identified
by comparing the value of 4 ∗ (tc1 + tc2) + tc3 + 1 with
the value of dsize. In fact, all checks in foo SB() can
be eliminated if 4 ∗ (tc1 + tc2) + tc3 + 1 ≤ dsize. Next,
through dependency analysis (detailed in section III-A) along
with profiling previous program executions, we find that the
value of 4 ∗ (tc1 + tc2) + tc3 + 1 depends on the input
arguments snum and ssize with positive coefficients, i.e.,
4∗(tc1+tc2)+tc3+1 = 3∗snum+ssize+1. Hence, given that
snum, ssize and dsize values from past executions are safe,
we can conclude that future executions are also guaranteed
to be safe for any smaller values of snum and/or ssize and
larger values of dsize. Combining the conditions derived from
past executions, we can effectively derive a set of sufficient
conditions (known as the safe region) for redundant check
elimination. In general, CHOP will build a safe region with
respect to the pointer-affecting variables based on all past
executions, and update it as new data points become available.
Fig. 5: System Diagram
Future executions that satisfy the conditions of such safe
region will be deemed as bound-safe. Note that it is possible
that for some functions, we cannot infer the linear relationships
among trip counts and function arguments. Hence we cannot
perform function-level bounds check decision based on the
function arguments, but have to get the values of pointer-
affecting variables inside the function to bypass potential
redundant bounds checking.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
CHOP consists of five modules: Dependency Graph con-
struction, Profile-guided Inference, Knowledge Base, Runtime
checks bypassing and Check-HotSpot Identification. Fig. 5
presents our system diagram. Given a target pointer, CHOP
aims to determine if the pointer dereference needs to be
checked. The pointer-affecting variables, which can affect the
value of target pointers (e.g., the base, offset and bound of
the array). The rules for safe regions are then created based
on the values of the pointer-affecting variables and are stored
in the knowledge base as inferences for future executions. If
the values of pointer-affecting variables satisfy the safe region
rules, then the corresponding pointer dereference is considered
to be safe.
A. Dependency Graph Construction
Dependency Graph (DG) is a bi-directed graph G = (V, E),
which represents program variables as vertices in V and
models the dependency between the variables and pointers’
bases/offsets/bounds through edges in E . We construct a DG
for each function including all of its pointers and the pointer-
affecting variables.
Definition 1 (DG-Node). The nodes in dependency graphs are
pointers and the variables that can affect the value of pointers
such as
• the variables that determine the base of pointers through
pointer initialization, assignment or casting;
• variables that affect the offset and bound of pointers like
array index, pointer increment and variables affecting
memory allocation size;
• Trip Counts - the auxiliary variables to assist the analysis
of loops. A trip count is the number of times a branch
(in which a target pointer value changes) is taken.
Definition 2 (DG-Edge). DG-Node v1 will have an out-edge
to DG-Node v2 if v1 can affect v2.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of dependency graph
construction for function foo(). First, we obtain all pointers
4and their pointer-affecting variables and represent them as
DG-Nodes. Second, for each pair of identified DG-Nodes, we
assign a DG-Edges according to the rules in Remark III-A.
Algorithm 1 Dependency graph construction for a given
function foo()
1: Input: source code of function foo()
2: Construct Abstract Syntax Tree, (AST) of function foo()
3: Initialize V = φ, E = φ
4: for each variable v in AST do
5: V = V + {v}
6: for each statement s in AST do
7: for each pair of variables j, k in s do
8: add edge e(j, k) to E according to Remark III-A
9: Output: Dependency-Graph G = (V, E)
Remark. Edges added into Dependency Graph:
E1 Assignment statements A := alpha·B
B→A
- If constant alpha is positive, then B is positively
correlated to A
- If constant alpha is negative, then B is negatively
correlated to A
E2 Function parameters Func(A,B) B↔ A
E3 Loops for.../while... Add Trip Counts to Loops
(1) Assignment inside Loops A := B TC→A
E4 Array Indexing A[i] i→A
B. Profile-guided Inference
Each function has its own dependency graph. After the de-
pendency graph is built, it includes all pointers in the function
and the pointer-affecting variables for all these pointers. We
traverse dependency graph and identify adjacent DG-Nodes
that represent the pointer-affecting variables associated with
each target pointer. The target pointer will have an entry in the
form of (func, ptr) : (var1, var2, ..., varn) where func and
ptr stand for functions and pointers, with vari being the name
of pointer-affecting variables associated with pointer ptr in
function func. By logging the values of these variables during
program executions, we then build conditions for bypassing
redundant runtime bounds check.
This module builds safe regions based on the pointer-
affecting variables identified by dependency graphs and up-
dates the safe regions through runtime data inference from
previous execution. Once the pointer-affecting variables for
the target pointer are identified as shown in Section III-A,
CHOP will collect the values of pointer-affecting variables and
produces a data point in Euclidean space for each execution.
The coordinates of each data point are the values of pointer-
affecting variables. The dimension of the Euclidean space is
the number of pointer-affecting variables for the target pointer.
The inference about pointer safety can be derived as follows.
Suppose a data point p from prior execution with pointer-
affecting variables vp1, vp2, ..., vpd, is checked and deemed
as safe. Another data point q for the same target pointer
but from another execution, is collected with pointer-affecting
variables vq1, vq2, ..., vqd. If each pointer-affecting variable of
q is not larger than that of p, e.g., vq1 ≤ vp1, vq2 ≤ vp2, ...,
vqd ≤ vpd, then the bounds checking on the target pointer
can be removed in the execution represented by q. Intuitively,
if the increase of a variable value causes an increase of
the index value or a decrease of the bound value, it will
be denoted as positively correlated point-affecting variable.
Similarly, the negatively correlated pointer-affecting variables
are those cause decrease in index values (or increase in bound
values) when they increase. The positively correlated pointer-
affecting variables are safe when they are smaller and nega-
tively correlated pointer-affecting variables are safe when they
are larger. We unify the representations of pointer-affecting
variables by converting a negatively-correlated variable varneg
to C − varneg where C is a large constant that could be
the maximum value of an unsigned 32-bit integer. Further,
if multiple data points from prior executions are available, we
integrate the safe conditions of individual data points to build
a safe region for future inference.
As mentioned previously, the safe region is where pointer
accesses are safe. In particular, the safe region of a single data
point is the enclosed area by projecting it to each axis, which
includes all input points that have smaller pointer-affecting
variable values. For example, the safe region of a point (3, 2)
is all points with the first coordinate smaller than 3 and the
second coordinate smaller than 2 in E2.
CHOP explores two approaches to obtain the safe region
of multiple data points: union and convex hull. The union
approach merges the safe regions generated by all existing data
points to form a single safe region. We consider a larger safe
region through building the convex hull of existing data points,
and then deriving the linear condition of convex hull boundary
as the condition for bypassing array bounds checking.
1) Union: Given a set S which consists of N data points in
ED, where D is the dimension of data points, we first project
point si ∈ S, i = 1, 2, ..., N , to each axis and build N enclosed
areas in ED, e.g., building safe region for each data point.
The union of these N safe regions is the safe region of S,
denoted by SR(S). Thus, if a new data point snew falls inside
SR(S), we can find at least one existing point sk from S that
dominates snew. That is to say, the enclosed projection area of
sk covers that of snew, which means for every pointer-affecting
variable, the vari of sk is larger than or equal to vari of
snew. Hence snew is guaranteed to be safe when accessing
the memory. Generally, when the index/offset variables of new
data points are smaller than existing data points or the bound
variable of new data point is larger than existing data point,
the new data point will be determined as safe.
2) Convex Hull: Given a set of points X in Euclidean space
ED, convex hull is the minimal convex set of points that
contains X , denoted by Conv(X). In other words, convex
hull of set X is the set of all convex combination of points in
X as shown in equation 1.
Conv(X) =
{ |X|∑
i=1
αixi
∣∣∣(∀i : αi ≥ 0) ∧ |X|∑
i
αi = 1
}
(1)
Based on prior n execution samplings, the values of pointer-
affecting variables are collected into a set S which consists
5of n data points {si|i = 1, 2, ..., n} in ED. The convex hull
of S is denoted by CH(S). Suppose the number of pointer-
affecting variables of target pointer is D, then each data point
in S is a D dimensional vector (si1,si2,...,siD). In this paper,
CHOP employs the quickhull [8] algorithm to construct the
convex hull of all data points in S as the safe region.
The reason of utilizing convex hull approach to construct
safe region is that, it is bounded by the convex linear com-
bination of data points, which is consistent with the linear
constraints among pointer-affecting variables. If there exists
a universal linear inequality of pointer-affecting variables for
each si with positive coefficients, then any point that is not
outside the convex hull CH(S) also has such linear inequality
for its pointer-affecting variables, as stated in theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In S, the coordinates of point si is
(si1,si2,...,siD). If ∀i ∈ {1,2, ...,n},
∑D
j=1 βjsij ≤ C, then for
all points ym ∈ CH(S),
∑D
j=1 βjymj ≤ C (C is a constant
and βj is the coefficient of sij).
Proof. Given ym ∈ CH(S) and equation 1, we have
ym =
n∑
i=1
αisi (2)
where ∀i : αi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i αi = 1.
Since ∀i ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, ∑Dj=1 βjsij ≤ C, then
αi
D∑
j=1
βjsij ≤ αiC (3)
By summing up equation 3 for i = 1 to n, we have
n∑
i=1
αi
D∑
j=1
βjsij ≤
n∑
i=1
αiC = C (4)
Further convert equation 4:
D∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
αisij ≤ C (5)
Substitute
∑n
i=1 αisij by ymj in equation 5, then
D∑
j=1
βjymj ≤ C (6)
Note that Theorem 1 can also be extended and applied to
linear inequalities where the coefficients are not necessarily
positive. As pointer bound information is added to dependency
entry at the format of (B − ptr bound), negatively related
variable var neg can be converted to new variables that have
positive coefficients by B − var neg.
N∑
i=1
βi · V ARi + βN+1(B − Pbound) <= C (7)
Where B is the bound of the target pointer and C is a
large constant such as 232 − 1. Equation 7 represents a
hyperplane in EN+1 which separates the EN+1 space into two
EN+1 subspaces. All normal data points that have legitimate
pointer operations will fall inside the same subspace. Hence
the convex hull built from these normal data points will be
contained in this subspace which means all bounds checking
on points falling inside or on the facet of this convex hull are
safe to be removed.
Thus, if the new data point is inside corresponding convex
hull, then the check can be removed and this check bypassing
is guaranteed to be safe.
Convex hulls with low dimensions are easy to represent.
Before convex hull construction, we will use dimension-
reduction techniques like PCA to eliminate dimensions that
have internal linear relationship. This is equivalent to filtering
out the planar points in a lower dimensional hyperplane from
the convex hull. If the convex hull turns out to be one
dimensional (line) or two dimensional (plane), then we can
easily represent it as an inequality. For higher-dimensional
convex hull, we will store the convex hull and verify the
check bypassing condition by determining if the point lies
inside, outside the convex hull or on its facet, which will be
described in the sectionIII-C. Compared with Union approach,
the safe region built by Convex Hull approach is expanded
and can achieve higher redundant checks bypassing under the
assumption that pointer-affecting variables are linearly related
to target pointers.
A
B C
D
x
y
P1
P2
/* x and y are two pointer-affecting 
variables */
char target[1024];
...
char item = target[x+2*y]
(1024-1)/2
1024-10
L
Fig. 6: Convex Hull vs Union in a two-dimensional example
We further illustrate the performance gain of convex hull
approach over union approach using the example shown in
Fig 6. We have a two-dimensional case where the array target
has two pointer-affecting variables x and y (the bound of
target in this example is a fixed value of 1024 and the
maximum value of legitimate index is 1023). target will be
dereferenced at the index x+2 ∗ y and the value is passed to
item. Suppose during one sampling execution, we observed
that the value of x is 160 and the value of y is 400. So we
have one data point, represented by P1 : P1 = (160, 400).
Similarly, from another execution, we get P2 = (510, 170).
And both of P1 and p2 are deemed as safe because SoftBound
has performed bounds checking in those two executions. When
the safe region is built by the union approach, it will be the
union of area A, B and C. On the other hand, if the safe region
is built by the convex hull approach, then it will be the union
of the area A,B,C and D. The optimal condition of the safe
region by convex hull would be the area enclosed by x axis, y
axis and the dashed line L. It also shows that the safe region
CHOP derives will never go beyond the theoretically optimal
safe region. The reason is that if any new data point falls
6within the top-right side of L, CHOP can tell that it’s outside
the current safe region. Hence, the default SoftBound checks
will be performed and out-of-bound access will be detected.
Such data points will not be collected by CHOP for updating
the safe region, i.e., all data points that CHOP collects will
be within the theoretically optimal safe region. Therefore, the
convex hull built by these data points will be a subset of the
optimal safe region.
3) Safe Region Update: There are data points that can
not be determined as safe or not by current safe region but
later verified as legitimate. Such data points can be used to
dynamically update the safe region. Given current safe region
SR(S) and the new coming data point snew, SR(S) will be
updated to SR(S)′ by:
SR′ = SR(S ∪ snew) = SR(S) ∪ SR(snew) = SR(S) ∪ T ,
(8)
where T is the set of safe points inside SR(snew) but outside
SR(S). If T is empty which means SR(snew) is contained
by SR(S), then there is no need to update the safe region
SR(S). Otherwise the update of safe region encapsulates two
scenarios:
• There are positively correlated pointer-affecting variables
(such as array index) of snew that have larger values than
corresponding pointer-affecting variables of all points in
SR(S),
• There are negatively correlated pointer-affecting variables
(such as bound of pointers) of snew that are smaller than
those of all points in SR(S)
When one or both of above scenarios occur, the safe region
will be enlarged to provide a higher percentage of redundant
bounds check bypassing. The safe region is updated in a
different thread from that of bounds checking so that it will
not contribute to the execution time overhead of the tesing
program.
C. Knowledge Base
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for deciding if a point is in convex
hull: isInHull()
1: Input: convex hull represented by m facets F = f1, f2..., fm
2: Input: normal vectors (pointing inward) of facets N = n1, ...nm
3: Input: new data point p
4: Output: isInHull
5: Init: isInHull = True
6: for i in [1,m] do
7: cur facet = fi
8: randomly select a point pi from fi
9: vi = p− pi
10: if vi · ni is negative then
11: isInHull = False
CHOP stores the safe regions for target pointers in a disjoint
memory space - the Knowledge Base. The data in Knowledge
Base represents the position and the sufficient conditions for
bypassing the redundant bounds checking for each target
pointer. Runtime Profile-guided Inference can be triggered to
compute the Safe Region by Knowledge Base when we detect
redundant checks, then the Knowledge Base can be updated
as more execution logs are available.
1) Union: For the Union approach, the values of pointer-
affecting variables of the target pointer are kept in the knowl-
edge base. Suppose we have a number of K prior executions
associated with pointer p which has D pointer-affecting vari-
ables, then a KxD matrix UKxDis stored. When performing
the bounds checking for pointer p in new executions, the value
of p’s pointer-affecting variables are compared with those
stored in U . Once a row in U can dominates p’s pointer-
affecting variables, which means the new data points that
represents this new execution is inside one existing point, p is
considered as safe in this new execution.
2) Convex Hull: CHOP determines whether the new point
is in Safe Region by the following method. For each facet
of the convex hull, the normal vector of the facet is also
kept in Knowledge Base. For a convex hull in ED, D points
that are not in the same hyperplane are sufficient to represent
a D dimensional facet. Suppose the convex hull built from
sampling runs has M facets. These M data points are stored in
the Knowledge Base as a hashmap in the format of (d : datad),
where d is the ID/index of data point and datad is the
coordinates of data point d. Then this convex hull can be
represented as a MxD matrix CHMxD where each element
is the index of sampling points and each row represents a D
dimensional facet. Now a new data point T is available and
CHOP will decide whether this new point is inside or outside
each of the M facets. Let Ni be the normal vector (pointing
inwards) of each facet fi , ∀i = 1, 2, ...,M . From facet fi,
randomly choose one point denoted by CH[i][j], link CH[i][j]
and the new point T to build a vector ~Vi. If the inner product
Pi of ~Vi and Ni is positive which means the projection of ~Vi
to Ni has the same direction with Ni, then point T is in the
inner side of facet fi. Repeat this for each facet, eventually,
if Pi ≥ 0∀ i=1,2,...,M, then the new point T is inside the
convex hull or right on the facets. We embed this process into
function isInHull() and demonstrate it in Algorithm 2.
If the data points are of one dimension, we store a threshold
of pointer-affecting variable as the safe region for checks
elimination. For higher dimensional data points, in case the
safe region becomes too complex, we can store a pareto
optimal safe region of less data points instead of the union
of safe regions.
D. Bypassing Redundant Array bounds checking
We instrument source code of benchmark programs to add
a CHECK CHOP() function. CHECK CHOP() verifies the
condition of bounds check elimination by comparing pointer-
affecting variables collected from new executions with statis-
tics from knowledge base.
Two levels of granularity for redundant bounds check by-
passing are studied: function level and loop level. a) Function-
level redundant bounds check bypassing conditions are verified
before function calls. If the new data point is inside the
built safe region, the propagation of bound information and
the bounds checking can be removed for the entire function.
b) Memory access through pointers inside loops are most
likely responsible for the high overhead of SoftBound checks.
Loop-level redundant bounds check bypassing is performed
7when the condition doesn’t hold for all target pointer deref-
erences inside the function. Instead of bypassing all bounds
checking for target pointer in the function, the condition for
bypassing bounds checking inside loops are examined. We
“hoist” the bounds checking outside the loop. The safe region
check is performed before the loop iterations. If the pointer
accesses in one iteration are considered safe, then the bounds
checking inside this iteration can be skipped.
E. Check-HotSpot Identification
In order to maximize the benefit of our runtime check
bypassing while maintaining simplicity, CHOP focuses on
program Check-HotSpots, which are functions associated with
intensive pointer activities and resulting in highest overhead
to bounds checking.
CHOP identifies Check-HotSpots using three steps as fol-
lows: a) Profiling testing program: We use Perf profiling
tool [9] to profile both a non-instrumented program and its
SoftBound-instrumented version. The execution time of each
function (with and without bounds checking) are recorded.
b) Analyzing function-level overhead Of : For each function
f , we calculate its individual contribution to bounds check
overhead, which is the time spent in f on SoftBound-induced
bounds checking, normalized by the total overhead of the test-
ing program. More precisely, let T and Tˆ be the execution time
of the non-instrumented, target program and its SoftBound-
instrumented version, and tf and tˆf be the time spent in
function f , respectively. We have Of = (tf − tˆf )/(T − Tˆ ).
c) Identifying Check-HotSpots: In general, we select all func-
tions with at least 5%1 function-level overhead as the Check-
HotSpots, which will be the target functions for bounds check
bypassing.
In our evaluation, we consider two different types of ap-
plications: interactive applications and non-interactive appli-
cations. For non-interactive applications, such as SPEC2006
benchmark, we use the testing inputs provide with the bench-
mark. For interactive applications (such as web severs and
browsers) that require user inputs and exhibit diversified
execution paths, we intentionally generate user inputs/requests
that are able to trigger desired execution paths of interest (e.g.,
containing potential memory bounds check vulnerabilities).
Check-HotSpots are then identified accordingly.
F. Example
CHOP instruments the code by adding two new branches as
shown in Fig.4. The function CHECK CHOP() verifies if the
inputs to function foo() satisfy the conditions for bounds check
bypassing(i.e., in the safe region). Then, one of the branches
is selected based on whether bounds checking are necessary.
Recall the SoftBound instrumented foo SB() function from
Fig. 3 . We add trip counts tc1, tc2 and tc3 for the three cases
in lines 17, 24 and 31, respectively. According to CHOP’s
dependency graph construction, there are edges from node
tc1, tc2 and tc3 to pointer node cp2. Further, the values of
1We use 5% as threshold to identify Check-HotSpots, while this number
can be varied depending on users’ preference.
Time spent in
Function Non-instrumentedversion (s)
SoftBound-instrumented
version(s)
SoftBound overhead
breakdown
F1 814.87 1580.03 32.08%
F2 977.08 1582.68 25.39%
F3 1.67 353.76 14.76%
F4 148.85 270.84 5.11%
TABLE I: Check-Hospot functions out of total 106 called-
functions from sphinx. Function names from F1 to F4, F1: vec-
tor gautbl eval logs3, F2: mgau eval, F3: utt decode block
and F4: subvq mgau shortlist.
4 ∗ (tc1 + tc2) + tc3 is determined by input variable ssize
and snum, producing edges from ssize and snum to trip
counts in the dependency graph. Thus, the pointer-affecting
variables for pointer cp2 are (ssize, snum,C − dsize). Sup-
pose that constant C is defined as 232 − 1 (i.e., the maxi-
mum 32-bit unsigned integer), and that we have three past
executions with pointer-affecting variable values as follows:
p1 = (200, 60, 2
32 − 1− 256), p2 = (180, 20, 232 − 1− 256)
and p3 = (150, 40, 232 − 1− 512). The safe region for check
elimination will be built based on above three data points
p1, p2, p3 in a E3 space according to the approach described
in section III-B.
In future executions, any input to function foo() gen-
erates a new data point p with pointer-affecting variables
(pssize, psnum, pdsize) for examination. It is verified by
CHECK CHOP() to determine if point p is inside this safe
region, in order to decide whether bounds check elimination
is possible. In particular, in the union approach, as long
as we can find one existing point pi (from p1, p2, p3) that
Pareto-dominates p, i.e., any pointer-affecting variables (i.e.,
components) of pi is greater than or equal to that of p, then
the memory access of pointer foo SB : cp2 is determined
to be safe. In convex hull approach, we need to solve the
convex hull containing points p1, p2, p3. With sufficient data,
the boundary of constructed convex-hull safe region can be
derived as ssize+3∗snum+1 ≤ dsize, e.g., after all corner
points have been observed. Similar to [4], CHOP applies to
both base and bound of arrays/pointers.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we explain in details how our system is
implemented. Fig. 7 shows the framework of CHOP with the
tools and algorithms we use in different modules. Modules in
CHOP can be categorized into two components: Pre-Runtime
Analysis and Runtime Checks Bypassing. Pre-Runtime Anal-
ysis can be executed offline and Runtime Checks Bypassing is
used to identify and avoid redundant checks during runtime.
To obtain Check-HotSpot, we profile non-instrumented pro-
grams as well as SoftBound-instrumented programs to get the
differences of execution time of user-level functions. Based
on Check-HotSpot results, we used Static Code Analysis tool
Joern to construct and traverse Dependency Graph to get
pointer-affecting variables for target pointers. By logging the
sampling executions, we build the union or convex hull for
safe regions as the check bypassing conditions and store them
in database for future inferences.
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Analysis and Runtime Checks Bypassing modules with the
tools used in different components
A. Dependency Graph Construction
Plenty of static code analysis tools exist for parsing and
analyzing source code, such as [10] [11] [12] [13]. In this
paper, we analyze the code in the format of Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST) [14] to build the dependency graph such that we
can easily obtain variable declaration types, statement types
and dependencies of variables. An AST reveals the lexical
structure of program code in a tree with variables/constants
being the leaves and operators/statements being inner nodes.
We build the AST using Joern [15]. Joern is a platform
for static analysis of C/C++ code. It generatescode property
graphs (such as CFG and AST) and stores them in a Neo4J
graph database.
Among all the variables in a function, we are only interested
in the pointers and pointer-affecting variables, e.g., a sub-AST
for each function without other redundancy. For this purpose,
we instrument AST API from Joern with the idea from [14],
where extracting sub-AST on the function level is studied.
The rules of constructing DG are shown in Algorithm 1
and Remark III-A in section III. After the dependency graph
is constructed, we traverse the dependency graph to identify
pointers for bounds check bypassing and use light-weight
tainting [16], [17] to determine the set of nodes connected
to target pointers from the dependency graph.
B. Statistical Inference and Knowledge Base
We employ Quickhull algorithm (Qhull) [8] to compute the
convex hull. For a target pointer that has D pointer-affecting
variables (including (C − ptr bound)) and n sampling runs,
we first generate n points in ED, then select the D boundary
points w.r.t each axis. As a result, a total of n+D points
in ED will be the input of convex hull construction. In
the running example, given the prior statistics mentioned in
Section III-F, these 6 points are a) (200, 60, 232 − 257),
b) (180, 20, 232− 257), c) (150, 40, 232− 513), d) (200, 0, 0),
e) (0, 60, 0), f) (0, 0, 232 − 257).
Note that integer overflow is a special case in bounds
checking. Assume an array arr is accessed by using arr[x+1].
A data point that was collected is (x = UINT MAX). Since
the expression x1 + 1 overflows, arr is accessed at position
0, which is safe if the array contains at least one element.
By the default rules in CHOP, (UINT MAX − 1) would
then be determined to be inside a safe region. However, since
no integer overflow occurs, arr at position UINT MAX
is accessed, which would result in an out-of-bound access.
Hence, CHOP performs special handling of integer overflow
when updating the safe region. Suppose the data point that
causes an integer overflow (x = UNIT MAX in this case)
is observed, when it is used to update the convex hull, we
will calculate if there is an integer overflow, by determine if
UNIT MAX ≥ UNITMAX − 1. In general, if arr is ac-
cessed by arr[x+y], we will check if x ≥ UNIT MAX−y
when updating the convex hull. If it holds, then we discard this
data point and do not update the convex hull. Since convex
hull updating happens offline, it will not affect the runtime
overhead of bounds checking.
We use SQLite [18] to store our Knowledge Base. We
created a table, which has fields including function names,
pointer names and the corresponding conditions for redundant
checks bypassing(e.g., the matrix mentioned in Section III-C).
For Union safe region, if the data points are of one dimen-
sion, we store a threshold of pointer-affecting variable as the
safe region for checks elimination. If the data points are of
higher dimension, we only store the data points that are in
the boundary of the union area. For Convex hull approach,
we store the linear condition of the safe region boundary in
the case of low-dimensional data points and a set of frontier
facets (as well as their normal vectors) in the case if high-
dimensional data points.
C. Bypassing Redundant Checks
For function-level redundant bounds check bypassing, we
maintain two versions of Check-Hotspot functions: the orig-
inal version (which contains no bounds checking) and the
SoftBound-instrumented version that has bounds checking. By
choosing one of the two versions of the function to be executed
based on the result of CHECK CHOP() verification, we can
either skip all bounds checking inside the function (if the
condition holds) or proceed to call the original function (if
the condition is not satisfied) where bounds checking would
be performed as illustrated in Fig. 4. The instrumentation of
CHECK CHOP() condition verification inside functions leads
to a small increase in code size (by about 2.1%), and we
note that such extra code is added only to a small subset of
functions with highest runtime overhead for SoftBound (see
Section III-E for details).
While function-level redundant bounds check bypassing
applies to the cases where all the target pointer dereferences
are safe inside the target function, loop-level removal provides
a solution for pointer dereferences that can only be considered
as partially safe when memory accesses inside loops are
closely related to the loop iterator. The safety of pointer
dereferences can be guaranteed when the value of loop iterator
9falls within certain range. In this case, we consider the loop
iterator as a pointer-affecting variable and incorporate iteration
information into the safe region. We duplicate loops similar to
duplicating functions. Before entering the loop, the function
CHECK CHOP() is called and if all bounds checking inside
the loop are considered safe, the check-free version of the loop
will be called.
D. Check-Hotspot Identification
The program profile tool Perf is used to identify the Check-
Hotspot functions. Perf is an integrated performance analysis
tool on Linux kernel that can trace both software events (such
as page faults) and hardware events (such CPU cycles). We
use Perf to record the runtime overhead of target functions.
We compile our test cases with SoftBound. For each
Check-Hotpost function, we calculate the time spent in non-
instrumented version and SoftBound-instrumented version,
then calculate the difference between them to get the overhead
of SoftBound checks. After ranking all functions according to
the execution time overhead of SoftBound checks, we consider
functions that contributes over 5% bounds checking overhead
as Check-Hotspot functions. Noting that we pick 5% threshold
for Check-Hotspot in this paper, but it can be customized
depending on specific usages.
TABLE I shows the results for Check-Hotspot Identification
for the application Sphinx3 from SPEC. In total, the four
functions listed in the table contribute over 72% runtime
overhead of SoftBound.
V. EVALUATION
We use SoftBound (version 3.4) as the baseline to evaluate
the effectiveness of CHOP on bypassing redundant bounds
checking. All experiments are conducted on a 2.54 GHz
Intel Xeon(R) CPU E5540 8-core server with 12 GByte of
main memory. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
We select two different sets of real world applications: (i)
Non-interactive applications including 8 applications from
SPEC2006 Benchmark suite, i.e., bzip2, hmmer, lbm, sphinx3,
libuquantum, milc, mcf and h264ref ; and (ii) Interactive appli-
cations including a light-weight web server thttpd (version beta
2.23). In the evaluation, we first instrument the applications
using SoftBound and employ Perf to identify the Check-
HotSpot functions in all applications. Similar to ABCD [4],
we consider the optimization of upper- and lower-bounds
checking as two separated problems. In the following, we
focus on redundant upper-bounds checking while the dual
problem of lower-bounds checking can be readily solved with
the same approach. In the experiments, we use both Union
and Convex Hull approaches to obtain bounds check bypassing
conditions for Check-HotSpot functions. We further compare
the performance between these two approaches if they have
different conditions for bounds check decisions. The inputs
we used for testing SPEC applications are from the reference
workload provided with SPEC benchmarks. For thttpd, we cre-
ated a script that randomly generate urls with variable lengths
and characters, then send them together with thttpd requests
to the server for evaluation. In general, for applications that
Fig. 8: Comparison of normalized execution time overhead
reduction between C.O.S and WPBound
Fig. 9: Comparison of bounds check removal ratio between
C.O.S and WPBound
do not provide developer supplied representative test cases,
we note that fuzzing techniques [19] [20] can be applied to
generate test cases. The policies considered in our evaluation
are a) SoftBound instrumentation (denoted as SoftBound).
b) CHOP Optimized SoftBound with redundant bounds check
bypassing (denoted as C.O.S).
Our Check-HotSpot identification identifies 23 functions
from all 9 applications mentioned above. For example, in
the application bzip2, the bounds check overhead of the
three functions bzip2::mainGtU, bzip2::generateMTFValues
and bzip2::BZ2 decompress contribute 68.35% to the total
bounds check overhead in bzip2. Similarly, we studied 98.01%
bounds check overhead in hmmer, 86.19% in lbm, 62.58%
in sphinx3, 72.71% in milc, 94.18% in libquantum, 69.55%
in h264ref, 69.51% in mcf, and 83.56% in thttpd. We note
that some Check-HotSpot functions contribute much more
than others to SoftBound overhead mainly because they are
executed frequently, e.g., bzip2::mainGtU is called more than
8 million times, even though they have small code footprints.
A. Removal of Redundant Array bounds checking
Fig. 8 shows the comparison of execution time overhead
reduction over SoftBound between C.O.S and WPBound,
normalized by the execution time of original applications
without performing bounds checking. In particular, we mea-
sure the runtime overhead for each Check-HotSpot functions,
before and after enabling CHOP. Due to the ability to by-
pass redundant bounds checking, C.O.S. achieves significant
overhead reduction. The highest reduction achieved by CHOP
is hmmer, with a 86.94% execution time reduction compared
to SoftBound. For bzip2, lbm, sphinx3 and thttpd, SoftBound
overheads are decreased from 39% to 8% , 55% to 18%,
31% to 11% and 66% to 12%. Overall, CHOP achieved
an average execution time reduction of 66.31% for Check-
HotSpot functions, while WPBound achieves 37% execution
overhead reduction on SPEC benchmarks.
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To illustrate CHOP’s efficiency in bypassing redundant
bounds checking, Table II and Table III show the number of
total bounds checking required by SoftBound and the number
of redundant checks bypassed by CHOP, along with rate of
false positives reported in C.O.S. Basically, we observed no
false positives in our experiments. In particular, Table III
compares the performance of the Union and Convex Hull
approaches in terms of the number of runtime bounds checking
being bypassed in two Check-HotSpot functions from thttpd.
Since both Check-HotSpot functions have high-dimensional
bound affecting variables, the conditions derived using Union
and Convex Hull are different. More precisely, the safe regions
constructed by Convex Hull dominates that of the Union
approach, leading to higher bypassing ratio. CHOP success-
fully removes 82.12% redundant bounds checking through
Convex Hull approach comparing to 59.53% by Union ap-
proach in thttpd::defang. Also, we compare the number of
bounds checking removed between CHOP and WPBound as
shown in Fig. 9. On average, CHOP successfully bypassed
71.29% runtime bounds checking for SPEC benchmarks while
WPBound can achieve 64%. We noted that for some of the
testing programs such as lbm, milc and libquantum, WPBound
outperforms our Convex Hull approaches. We examined the
reasons and explained it in section V-D6.
B. Memory overheads and code instrumentation due to CHOP
We note that CHOP’s memory overhead for storing Knowl-
edge Base and additional code instrumentation are modest,
since the Knowledge Base mainly stores the constructed safe
region, which can be fully represented by data points as
described in section III-C. The safe region can be stored as a
two-dimensional matrix, with each row representing one facet
of the convex hull. Storing such matrix is light-weight. Our
experiments show that the worst memory overhead is only
20KB for the benchmarks we evaluated and the maximum
code size increased is less than 5% of the check-hotspot
functions. Across all applications, CHOP has an average
7.3KB memory overhead with an average 2.1% code increase.
Overall, we reduce memory overhead by roughly 50% com-
pared to SoftBound memory requirements.
C. Execution time Overhead caused by CHOP
CHOP bypasses redundant bounds checking by program
profiling and safe region queries. We perform a comparison on
the breakdown of execution time and found that the average
overhead of a SoftBound check is 0.035s while the average
of CHECK CHOP()(together with trip count) overhead is
0.0019s.
D. Case Studies
In this section, we present detailed experimental results on
the effectiveness of bounds check bypassing for both Union
and Convex Hull approaches. Note that we only present the
results from Convex Hull approach if the removal conditions
are the same with Union approach. For those functions with
different removal conditions, we further compare the perfor-
mance between these two approaches. We also summarize
the SoftBound overhead before and after redundant bounds
checking bypassing using CHOP’s Convex Hull approach, as
well as the resulting execution time reduction, as shown in
Table IV and Table V.
1) bzip2: bzip2 is a compression program to com-
press and decompress inputs files, such as TIFF image and
source tar file. We identified three Check-HotSpot functions
in bzip2: bzip2::mainGtU, bzip2::generateMTFValues and
bzip2::BZ2 decompress. We use the function bzip2::mainGtU
as an example to illustrate how CHOP avoids redundant run-
time checks in detail. Using Dependency Graph Construction
from section III-A, we fist identify nblock, i1, and i2 as the
pointer-affecting variables in bzip2::mainGtU function. For
each execution, the Profile-guided Inference module computes
and updates the Safe Region, which results in the following
(sufficient) conditions for identifying redundant bounds check-
ing in bzip2::mainGtU:
nblock > i1 + 20 or nblock > i2 + 20.
Therefore, every time this Check-HotSpot function is called,
CHOP will trigger runtime check bypassing if the inputs vari-
ables’ values nblock, i1, and i2 satisfy the conditions above.
Because its Safe Region is one dimensional, the calculation of
check bypassing conditions is indeed simple and only requires
program input variables i1 and i2 (that are the array indexes)
and nblock (that is the input array length). If satisfied, the
conditions result in complete removal of bounds checking in
function bzip2::mainGtU. Our evaluation shows that it is able
to eliminate over 99% redundant checks.
For the second Check-HotSpot func-
tion bzip2::generateMTFValue, CHOP determines that
array bounds checking could be bypassed for five different
target pointers inside of the function. In this case, CHOP
optimization reduces execution time overhead from 77.21s to
39.46s. We can see this number is near proportional to the
number of checks removed by CHOP in Table II.
The last Check-HotSpot function bzip2::BZ2 decompress
has over 200 lines of code. Similar to func-
tion bzip2::generateMTFValue, it also has five target pointers
that share similar bounds check conditions. CHOP deploys a
function-level removal for function bzip2::BZ2 decompress.
As we can see from Table IV, CHOP obtained a 74.42%
execution time reduction, which is consistent with the number
of redundant bounds checking identified by CHOP presenting
in Table II.
2) hmmer: hmmer is a program for searching DNA gene
sequences, which implements the Profile Hidden Markov Mod-
els algorithms and involves many double pointer operations.
There is only one Check-HotSpot function, P7Viterbi, which
contributes over 98% of SoftBound overhead.
Inside of the function hmmer::P7Viterbi, there are four
double pointers: xmx, mmx, imx and dmx. To cope with double
pointers in this function, we consider the row and column
array bounds separately and construct a Safe Region for each
dimension. Besides the 4 double pointers, we also construct
conditions for check bypassing for another 14 pointers. The
SoftBound overhead is significantly reduced from 3701.11s to
812.91s, rendering an execution time reduction of 78.94% .
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Benchmark::Function Name Total bounds checking Redundant checks bypassed False Positive
bzip2::generateMTFValues 2,928,640 1,440,891 (49.2%) 0 (0.0%)
bzip2::mainGtU 81,143,646 81,136,304 (99.9%) 0 (0.0%)
bzip2::BZ2 decompress 265,215 196,259 (74.0%) 0 (0.0%)
hmmer::P7Viterbi 176,000,379 124,960,267 (71.0%) 0 (0.0%)
lbm::LBM performStreamCollide 128277886 128277886 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
sphinx3::vector gautbl eval logs3 2,779,295 2,779,295 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
sphinx3::mgau eval 725,899,332 725,899,332 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
sphinx3::subvq mgau shortlist 24,704 4,471 (18.1%) 0 (0.0%)
thttpd::httpd parse request 9,990 9,990 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)
thttpd::handle newconnect 9,121 7,300 (80.0%) 0 (0.0%)
TABLE II: Number of bounds checking required by SoftBound and bypassed by CHOP in each Check-HotSpot function
through Convex Hull Optimization
Benchmark::Function name Total bounds checking Redundant checks bypassed False PostiveUnion Approach Convex Hull
thttpd::expand symlinks 4,621 3,828 (82.84%) 4,025(87.10%) 0 (0.0%)
thttpd::defang 4,122 2,452 (59.53%) 3,382 (82.12%) 0 (0.0%)
TABLE III: Comparison of redundant bounds checking bypassed by CHOP between Union and Convex Hull Approaches
Time spent in
Function name SoftBound C.O.S Bounds Check Time Reduction
bzip2::generateMTFValues 77.21s 39.46s 48.89%
bzip2::mainGtU 47.94s 6.26s 86.94%
bzip2::BZ2 decompress 35.58s 9.10s 74.42%
hmmer::P7Viterbi 3701.11s 812.91s 78.04%
lbm::LBM performStreamCollide 1201.79s 407.06s 66.13%
sphinx3::vector gautbl eval logs3 1580.03s 318.10s 79.87%
sphinx3::mgau eval 1582.68s 473.10s 70.11%
sphinx3::subvq mgau shortlist 270.84s 221.81s 18.1%
thttpd::httpd parse request 151.2s 121.0s 95.80%
thttpd::handle newconnect 40.4s 12.9s 73.52%
TABLE IV: Execution time of Check-HotSpot functions for SoftBound and C.O.S, and the resulting bounds check time
reduction. Time spent in
Function name SoftBound C.O.S Bounds Check Time ReductionUnion Approach Convex Hull Union Approach Convex Hull
thttpd::expand symlinks 19.6s 5.30s 3.70s 72.91% 81.12%
thttpd::defang 5.37s 2.44s 1.21s 54.56% 77.46%
TABLE V: Comparison of Execution time of Check-HotSpot functions under SoftBound and CHOP between Union and Convex
Hull Approaches.
3) lbm: lbm is developed to simulate incompressible
fluids in 3D and has only 1 Check-HotSpot function:
lbm::LBM performStreamCollide. The function has two point-
ers (as input variables) with pointer assignments and deref-
erencing inside of a for-loop. It suffers from high bounds
check overhead in SoftBound, because pointer dereferencing
occurs repeatedly inside the for loop, which results in frequent
bounds checking. On the other hand, CHOP obtains the bounds
check bypassing conditions for each pointer dereferencing.
By further combining these conditions, we observed that the
pointer dereferencing always access the same memory address,
implying that it is always safe to remove all bounds checking
in future executions after bounds checking are performed in the
first execution. Thus, CHOP is able to bypass 100% redundant
checks which leads to an execution time reduction of 66.13%
.
4) sphinx3: Sphinx3 is a well-known speech recogni-
tion system, it is the third version of sphinx derived from
sphinx2 [21]. The first Check-HotSpot function in Sphinx3 is
sphinx3::vector gautbl eval logs3 and there are four target
pointers inside this function. Due to the identical access
pattern, once we derive the bounds check bypassing conditions
for one single pointer, it also applies to all the others, allowing
all redundant checks to be bypassed simultaneously in this
function. As shows in Table II, CHOP bypass 100% of
redundant checks with a resulting execution time of 318.10s,
which achieves the optimal performance.
We observed a similar behavior for the second Check-
HotSpot function in Sphinx3: sphinx3::mgau eval. CHOP
achieves 100% redundant bounds check bypassing with an ex-
ecution time reduction of 70.11%, from 1582.68s in SoftBound
to 473.10s after CHOP’s redundant bounds check bypassing.
The last function sphinx3::subvq mgau shortlist also has
12
four target pointers. CHOP optimized SoftBound incurs an
overhead of 221.81s, when the original SoftBound overhead
is 270.84s. For this function, CHOP only removed 18.1%
redundant checks, which is the lowest in our evaluations.The
reason is that the pointer vqdist inside this function has indirect
memory access, that its index variable is another pointer map.
The dependency graph we constructed cannot represent the
indirect memory access relation between these two pointers.
Since CHOP is not able to handle pointers that perform
indirect memory accesses, it only removes about 18% of the
bounds checking. We note that capturing such memory access
dependencies is possible via extending our dependency graph
to model complete memory referencing relations. We will
consider this as future work.
5) thttpd: thttpd is a light-weight HTTP server. A buffer
overflow vulnerability has been exploited in thttpd 2.2x ver-
sions within a function called thttpd::defang(), which replaces
the special characters ”<” and ”>” in url str with ”&lt;” and
”&gt;” respectively, then outputs the new string as dfstr. The
function thttpd::defang() can cause an buffer overflow when
the length of the new string is larger than 1000. To evaluate the
performance of CHOP, we generate 1000 thttpd requests with
random URL containing such special characters, and submit
the requests to a host thttpd server to trigger thttpd::defang().
CHOP’s dependency analysis reveals that the pointer dfstr
has two pointer-affecting variables s and n, where s denotes
the total number of special characters in the input url and
n denotes the length of the input url. The bound of dfstr
is a constant value of 1000. To illustrate the safe region
construction using Convex Hull and Union approaches, we
consider the first two input data points from two executions:
(s1, n1) = (1, 855) and (s2, n2) = (16, 60). It is easy to
see that based on the two input data points, the safe region
built by Union approach is SRunion = SR(1) ∪ SR(2),
where SR(1) = {(s, n) : 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ 855} and
{(s, n) : 0 ≤ s ≤ 16, 0 ≤ n ≤ 60} are derived from
the two data points, respectively. On the other hand, our
Convex Hull approach extends SRunion into a convex hull
with linear boundaries. It results in a safe region SRconvex
= {(s, n) : 0 ≤ s ≤ 16, 0 ≤ n ≤ 855, 53 ∗ s + n ≤ 908}.
As the ground truth, manual analysis shows that the sufficient
and necessary condition for safe bounds checking removal is
given by an optimal safe region SRopt = {(s, n) : 3 ∗ s +
n+1 <= 1000}. While more input data points are needed to
achieve SRopt, the safe region constructed using Convex Hull
approach significantly improves that of Union approach, under
the assumption that the pointer-affecting variables are linearly
related to target pointers and array bounds. With 10 randomly
generated thttpd requests, we show in Table III that CHOP’s
Convex Hull approach successfully bypasses 82.12% redun-
dant bounds checking with 0 false positive, whereas Union
approach in Table III and Table V is able to bypass 59.53%
redundant bounds checking. Furthermore, Union approach has
14.89% runtime overhead, compared to 21.90% for Convex
Hull approach. This is because the runtime redundant checks
identification in Union approach only requires (component-
wise) comparison of an input vector and corner points. On the
other hand, Convex Hull approach needs to check whether the
input vector falls inside a convex safe region, which requires
checking all linear boundary conditions and results in higher
runtime overhead. Additionally, CHOP bypass 100% runtime
bounds checking in function thttpd::httpd parse request and
73.52% checks in function thttpd::handle newconnect.
6) Others: We also have some interesting results due to im-
perfect profiling. For example, in the application libquantum,
the Check-HotSpot functions are small and we only identify
3 linear assignment and 3 non-linear assignment of related
pointers. Thus the convex hull approach will be ineffective.
As shown in Fig. 9, we can only remove less than 50%
runtime checks when WPBound can remove much more.
Similarly, in the application milc, a large portion of the pointer-
related assignments have multiplication and convex hull-based
approach cannot deal with non-linear relationships among
pointer-affecting variables. Additionally, in the application
lbm, due to the intensive use of macros for preprocessor, our
static code parsing tool cannot recognize the complete function
bodies. As a result, WPBound outperforms CHOP on the ratio
of dynamic bounds check reduction and execution overhead
reduction.
VI. DISCUSSION
We discuss some limitations of our current design in this
section.
CHOP currently is built to optimize SoftBound. Since
CHOP is based on SoftBound (which is built upon LLVM), it
currently only works on programs compiled with Clang. We
note that this research framework can be easily extended to
other environments with engineering effort.
The test programs need to be profiled. In order to find the
Check-HotSpot functions, we have to compile the programs
with and without SoftBound. Also, test programs are executed
several times to initialize the Safe Region. However, this Safe
Region initialization is a one-time effort and will not need to
be repeated.
The performance of convex hull approach could drop
when the dimension of data points gets too high. As shown
in our evaluation, the time overhead of convex hull approach
could be higher than that of union approach. The higher the
dimension of convex hull is, the more facets the safe region
has and the more comparisons it will need to decide if a new
data point is in the convex hull. However, since the query to
convex hull only needs to occur once per function (in function-
level check bypassing), it still reduce the runtime overhead of
SoftBound, and it will provide high ratio of check bypassing
compared against Union approach.
The convex hull approach is built on an assumption.
In order to build the convex hull as Safe Region, CHOP will
require the relationship among the pointer-affecting variables
to be linear. We show the ratio of linear assignments from the
applications in Table VI. The examples of linear and non-linear
assignments related to pointers include but are not limited to
the following:
Linear assignments:
• cand x=offset x+spiral search x[pos]
• v=s→selectorMtf[i]
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Application Related Assignments Ratio ofLinear Assignments(%)Linear Non-linear
Bzip2 1174 60 95.1
lbm 58 40 59.2
sphinx3 342 45 88.4
hmmer 687 6 99.1
h264ref 298 11 96.4
libquantum 3 3 50
milc 162 78 67.5
Total 2724 243 91.8
TABLE VI: Number of linear and non-linear assignments on
Check-HotSpot functions from SPEC2006 applications.
Non-linear assignments:
• i1=sizeof(block)/sizeof(block[0])
• int max pos=(2·search range+1)·(2·search range+1);
We observe that most applications from SPEC2006 have
high ratios of linear pointer-related assignments. The ratio of
non-linear assignments is higher in some applications such
as lbm, where we found that it intensively uses macros. The
assignments with macros and functions calls will be classified
as non-linear assignments by our algorithm. In the function sr-
cGrid from lbm, the macro SRC ST(srcGrid) performs certain
calculation based on the grid index and value from srcGrid.
CHOP does not perform bounds check bypassing beyond
the function level. We will consider the inter-procedural
analysis in our future works to detect redundant bounds check
across the whole program [22], [23].
VII. RELATED WORK
C and C++ are unsafe programming languages and plenty of
efforts have been made towards securing the memory usages
of C/C++ programs [24]. Memory safety and usage analysis
have been studied widely [25], [26], [27], [28]. Some existing
works try to find memory-related vulnerabilities in source
code or IR (during compilation) by direct static analysis [29],
[11], [30], [10], [31]. For example, splint [11] utilizes light-
weight static analysis to detect bugs in annotated programs,
by checking if the properties of the program are consistent
with the annotation. Yamaguchi et. al. [30], [14] use machine
learning techniques to identify the similarity of code patterns
to facilitate discovery of vulnerabilities. Clone-Hunter [32] and
Clone-Slicer [32] aim to detect code clones in program bina-
ries for accelerated bounds check removal. Nurit et. al. [31]
target string-related bugs in C program with a conservative
pointer analysis using abstracted constraint expressions for
pointer operations similar to ABCD [4].
While such static techniques can be quite scalable and low-
cost (with no impact to runtime overhead), it often result in
incomplete and inaccurate analysis. Pure static code analysis
could suffer from undecidable factors that can only be known
during runtime. Hence, some works build safety rules based on
source code or compile time analysis, then enforce such rules
during runtime to prevent undesired behaviors such as out-
of-bound accesses or unauthorized control flow transfers [33],
[34], [35], [36], [3], [37], [38], [39]. Necula et. al. propose
CCured [33], which is a type safe system that leverages rule-
based type inference to determine “safe pointers. It categories
pointers into three types {safe, seq, dynamic} then applies
different checking rules for them. Akritidis et.al [35] perform
points-to analysis during compile time to mark the objects
that can be written to, then prevent writes to unmarked objects
during runtime. They also enforce the control transfers accord-
ing to a pre-built CFG. As mentioned previously, SoftBound
works in a similar way. It is built upon LLVM to track
pointer metadata and perform bounds check when pointers are
dereferenced.
Such approaches typically instrument the program to insert
customized checks which will be activated during runtime.
Hence, the performance could be a serious issue due to the
additional checks and metadata operations. Techniques that
remove redundant checks to boost the runtime performance
have been studied [4], [5], [40], [41], [6]. WPBound statically
analyzes the ranges of pointer values inside loops. During
runtime, it compares such ranges with the actual runtime
values obtained from SoftBound to determine if the bounds
check can be removed from the loops. Wu¨rthinger et. al. [41]
eliminate the bounds check based on the static analysis upon
JIT IR during program compiling and keep a condition for
every instruction that computes an integer value. Different
from these works, SIMBER [6] and CHOP utilizes historical
runtime data and profile-guided inferences to perform bounds
check. However, SIMBER only uses union approach to con-
struct safe region for bounds check bypassing and suffers from
low bounds check bypassing rate in large-scale applications
with multiple pointer-affecting variables.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose CHOP, a framework integrates
profile-guided inference with spatial memory safety checks
to perform redundant bounds check bypassing through Con-
vex Hull Optimization. CHOP targets frequently executed
functions instrumented by SoftBound that have redundant
bounds checking. Our experimental evaluation on two different
sets of real-world benchmarks shows that CHOP can obtain
an average 71.29% reduction in array bounds checking and
66.31% reduction in bounds check execution time.
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